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Thanks to Oxford University Press for permitting me to offer Chapter 1 as a preview.  
 
Chapter 1: Agency as Art 
 
 
Games can seem like an utterly silly way to spend one’s time. We struggle and strain 
and sweat — and for what? The goals of games seem so utterly arbitrary. Game players 
burn energy and effort, not on curing cancer or saving the environment, but on trying to 
beat each other at some unnecessary, invented activity. Why not spend that time on some-
thing real?  
But the goals of a game aren’t actually arbitrary at all. They only seem arbitrary when 
we look in the wrong place. In the rest of life, we are used to justifying our goals by look-
ing at the value of the goals themselves, or by looking to forward to what follows from 
those goals. But with the goals of games, we often need to look backwards. We need to 
look at the value of the activity of pursuing those goals. In ordinary practical life, we 
usually take the means for the sake of the ends. But in games, we can take up an end for 
the sake of the means. Playing games can be a motivational inversion of ordinary life. 
Seeing this motivational structure will also help us to understand the essential nature 
of games. A game tells us to take up a particular goal. It designates abilities for us to use 
in pursuing that goal. It packages that all up with a set of obstacles, crafted to fit those 
goals and abilities. A game uses all these elements to sculpt a form of activity. And when 
we play games, we take on an alternate form of agency. We take on new goals and accept 
different sets of abilities. We give ourselves over to different — and focused — way of 
inhabiting our own agency. Goals, ability, and environment: these are the means by 
which the game designer practices their art. And flexing our own agency to fit — that is 
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how we experience the game designer’s art. 
Games, then, are a unique social technology. They are a method for inscribing forms 
of agency into artifactual vessels: for recording them, preserving them, and passing them 
around. And we possess a special ability: we can be fluid with our agency and submerge 
ourselves in alternate agencies designed by another. In other words, we can use games 
as to communicate forms of agency. Games are part of our human practices of inscription. 
Painting lets us record sights, music lets us record sounds, stories lets us record narrative, 
and games let us record agencies. That can be useful as part of our development. Just as 
novels let us experiences lives we have not lived, games let us experience forms of agency 
we might not have discovered on our own. But those shaped experiences of agency can 
be valuable in themselves, as art. 
Consider Sign, a product of the avant-garde wing of role-playing games (Hymes and 
Seyalioglu 2015). It's a live-action role-playing game about inventing language. The game 
is based on a true story. In the 1970s, Nicaragua had no sign language; deaf children were 
deeply isolated. Eventually, the government brought together deaf children from across 
the country to form an experimental school, whose goal was to teaching those children 
to lip-read. Instead, the children collectively and spontaneously invented their own sign 
language. In the game Sign, the players take up the roles of those children. The game 
assigns each player a backstory, and an inner truth that they have always wanted to com-
municate. For example, “I’m afraid one day I’ll be like my parents,” and “I’m afraid [my 
cat] Whiskers thinks I’ve left her.”  
The game is played in total silence. The only way to communicate is through a new 
sign language, which the players will invent during the game. There are three rounds. In 
each round, every player invents a single sign and teaches it to the other players. Then, 
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all players attempt to have a freeform conversation, desperately struggling to communi-
cate through their tiny inventory of signs. Invented signs get used and modified; new 
signs evolve spontaneously from old signs. Communication happens painfully and 
slowly, with the occasional rare and luminous breakthrough. And every time you feel 
that you are misunderstood, or do not understand somebody else, you must take a 
marker and make a "compromise mark" on your hand.  
The experience of the game is utterly marvelous. It is intense, absorbing, frustrating, 
and surprisingly emotional. But to have that experience, the player must commit, tempo-
rarily, to the goal of communicating their particular inner truth. And that commitment, 
combined with the particular rules of the game, leads to a very concentrated practical 
experience. To play Sign is to become utterly absorbed in the practical details of inventing 
language and stabilizing meanings.  
Here, then, is the particular motivational state of game playing which I wish to inves-
tigate. The rules of the game tell us to care about something and we start caring about it. 
A board game instructs us to care about collecting one color of token. A video game tells 
us to care about stomping on little mushroom people. A sport tells us to get a ball in a net. 
In order to achieve that cherished state of absorbed play, we let that goal occupy our con-
sciousness, for a while. And the fact that the game designer specifies goals and abilities 
for the player to take on —  that is precisely what makes games distinctive as an art form.1  
 
 
Frameworks and approaches 
My interest here is in uncovering the unique potential and the special value of games. 
                                                             1	For	simplicity’s	sake,	I	will	speak	as	if	there	is	a	singular	game	designer,	when	in	actuality,	games	are	often	designed	in	large	teams.	
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There have been, in recent years, many arguments for the value and importance of games. 
In many cases, however, these arguments tend to avoid looking at some of the more 
unique qualities of games. Instead, they assimilate games to some other, more respectable 
category of human practice. We’ve seen arguments that games are art because they are a 
type of fiction (Tavinor 2009). We’ve seen arguments that games are a type of cinema, 
which add a new technique — interactivity — to the familiar lexicon of cinematic tech-
niques (Gaut 2010). We’ve seen arguments that games are a kind of conceptual art that is 
valuable when it offers social critique (Flanagan 2013). We’ve seen arguments that games 
can be a special way of making arguments, with can criticize economic and political sys-
tems by simulating them (Frasca 2003; Bogost 2010). And surely, games can function in 
these ways. Many modern video games surely are a kind of fiction and a kind of interac-
tive cinema. And games can, as Ian Bogost puts it, function as a kind of procedural rhet-
oric, making arguments by modeling causal systems in the world. But I worry that over-
emphasizing these sorts of approaches may also suppress our appreciation and under-
standing of the truly unique potential of games.2  
Over in the philosophy of sport, the value of game playing is usually spelled out in 
terms of skills, excellences, and achievements. But notice that this also cashes out the 
value of games in some very familiar currency. For example, Tom Hurka argues that 
games are valuable because they enable difficult achievements. But difficult achieve-
ments are, obviously, not confined to games. Curing cancer and inventing a better mouse-
                                                             2	My	account	is	moderately	aligned,	in	spirit,	with	those	scholars	who	call	themselves	‘ludologists’,	who	argue	that	games	are	a	unique	category	and	should	be	studied	as	such.	For	surveys	of	ludology,	and	of	the	de-bate	between	narratology	and	ludology,	see	(Nguyen	2017c)	and	(Kirkpatrick	2011,	48-86).	For	key	texts	of	ludology,	see	(Aarseth	1997;	Frasca	1999;	Eskelinen	2001).	I	differ	from	some	of	the	classic	positions	in	lu-dology	in	many	of	the	details.	In	particular,	see	Chapters	3-6.	
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trap would also be difficult achievements, and they would give us something useful, be-
sides. This leads Hurka to conclude that playing games is generally less valuable than 
engaging in more useful non-game activities. Science and philosophy are valuable in the 
same way as games, in offering difficult achievements, but also valuable other ways. They 
give us at truth and understanding, or at least some useful tools, as well as difficulty. 
Games can offer us only difficulty (Hurka 2006). Games might truly come into their own, 
says Hurka, once we’ve solved all our practical problems and entered some sort of 
techno-futurist Utopia. But in the meantime, we’re probably better off doing something 
more useful with our lives. Notice that Hurka’s conclusion arises precisely because he 
thinks games are valuable in virtue of something rather commonplace — difficulty — 
rather than in virtue of something unique. Thus, the value of games is easily superseded 
by the value of other, equally difficult but more practical activities. 
All these approaches miss much of what’s special about games. Games, I will argue, 
are a distinctive art form. They offer us access to a unique artistic horizon and a distinctive 
set of social goods. They are special, as an art, because they engage with human practi-
cality — with our ability to decide and do. And they are special, as a practical activity, 
precisely because they are an art. In ordinary life, we have to struggle to deal with what-
ever the world throws at us using whatever means we happen to have lying around. In 
ordinary life, the form of our struggle is usually forced on us by an indifferent and arbi-
trary world. In games, on the other hand, the form of our practical engagement is inten-
tionally and creatively configured by the game’s designers. In ordinary life, we have to 
desperately fit ourselves to the practical demands of the world. In games, we can engineer 
the world of the game, and the agency we will occupy, to fit us and our desires. Struggles 
in games can be carefully shaped in order to be interesting, fun, or even beautiful for the 
struggler.  
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This is enabled, in significant part, by the peculiar nature of our in-game ends. Games 
ends are extremely different from the sorts of ends we stand behind in ordinary life. Our 
values, in ordinary life, are largely recalcitrant. Much of what we value seems universal 
and immoveable. We value life, freedom, and happiness. Even with our personal values, 
there’s typically little short-term flex. I care about art, creativity, and philosophy. Chang-
ing my core values would take, at the very least, significant time and effort. My basic 
values are thick and recalcitrant. But game activity is different. We can change our in-
game ends easily and fluidly. We can adopt new ends, which will guide our actions for 
the duration of the game, and then drop them in an instant. When we play games, we 
take on temporary agencies — temporary sets of abilities and constraints, along with tem-
porary ends. We have a significant capacity for agential fluidity, and games make full use 
of that capacity.  
 
 
Suits and striving 
Why think we have this strange capacity for agential fluidity? The best place to start 
is Bernard Suits' analysis of games. Let’s start with what Suits calls the “portable version” 
of his definition (Suits 2005, 55): 
 
Playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.  
 
In a marathon, the point isn’t simply to get to the finish line. Usually, we don’t actually 
care about being at that particular spot, in and of itself. We know because we don’t try to 
get there as efficiently as possible. We don’t take shortcuts, and we don’t take a taxi. The 
whole point is to get there within certain limitations. Suits contrasts game playing with 
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what he calls ‘technical activity’. In technical activity, there is some end that we value, 
and we pursue it because of the value of that end. Since that end is genuinely valuable, 
we try to pursue it as efficiently as we can. But in games, we don’t take the most efficient 
route to our in-game ends. In game-playing, we try to achieve some specified end under 
certain specified inefficiencies. The end is largely valuable only when achieved inside 
those constraints. We can tell that this is our motivational structure, precisely because we 
are willing to set up blockades to that end. By itself, getting a ball through a stupid little 
basket has no independent value on its own. I don’t go to the basketball court after hours 
with a ladder and spend hours passing the ball through the hoop; nor do I pull out my 
Monopoly set by myself, and roll myself around in heaps of Monopoly money, glorying in 
all that I command. Getting the ball through the hoop or holding Monopoly money in my 
hand is worthless, outside of the constraints and structure of the game.  
We must distinguish here carefully here between the goals of a game and our purpose 
in playing that game. The goal of a game is the target we aim at during the game: getting 
to the finish line first, making more baskets, maximizing points. Our purpose with a 
game, on the other hand, is our reason for playing the game in the first place. Our purpose 
in playing a game might be to have some fun, or to get some exercise, to de-stress, to 
develop our skills, to vanquish our opponents, achieve some difficult task, or even to 
experience the beauty of our own skilled action. 
For some game players, goal and purpose can be one and the same. A professional 
poker player is just in it for the money; an Olympic sprinter just wants to be win, period 
— for these players, the goal is the purpose. Winning is genuinely valuable for them. For 
other game players, the goal and purposes are distinct, but achieving the purpose follows 
from achieving the goal in a straightforward way. This basketball player wants to win for 
the sake of fame and status; this Starcraft 2 professional wants to win the tournament for 
 9 
the prize money. For these types of players, winning is only a means to their true purpose, 
but it is still genuinely valuable to them. 
What Suits exposes, however, is another, entirely different motivational structure: that 
our goal and purpose in a game might be entirely skew to one another. When I play a 
party game with my friends, my goal is to win, but my purpose is to have fun. The way 
to have fun is to try, during the game, to win. But I don’t really care if I win or not — not 
in any lasting way. I have to chase the goal of winning to fulfill my purpose, but I don’t 
actually need to win in order to have fun. Winning, in this case, is rather incidental to my 
true purpose. In fact, if I start up a game of Charades for the sake of a little fun, but I am 
so aggressive and competitive that I make everybody else miserable, then I may have 
succeeded in achieving the goals of the game, but I have failed entirely in my purpose. 
Suits took himself to be offering a complete account of games and game playing. For 
this he has been roundly criticized. There are, as many have pointed out, aspects of game 
playing that do not conform to Suits' theory. Some games involve no real struggle against 
obstacles at all, such as certain children’s games of make believe. Certain narratively ori-
ented tabletop roleplaying games like Fiasco, and narrative computer games, like The 
Stanley Parable, also don’t seem oriented around struggles and obstacles. I agree with 
these criticisms. I do not think Suits has provided a complete account of all forms of game 
playing.3 But we should not throw away Suit’s analysis entirely, just because he failed in 
his stated goal. Let us adapt Suits' analysis and treat it, instead, as an exceedingly insight-
ful description of one particular — but very important — form of game play. For the re-
mainder of this book, I will focus on understanding those games and playings that fit the 
                                                             3	Criticism	of	Suits	on	this	point	is	a	common	refrain;	see	(Upton	2015,	16)	for	a	representative	example.	I	provide	an	extended	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	make	believe	play	and	striving	play	in,	and	an	argu-ment	against	Suits'	account	as	being	a	complete	one	of	games,	in	(Nguyen	forthcoming).	
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Suitsian definition.4 For the sake of brevity, whenever I simply use the bare term ‘game’, 
please take me to be referring to Suitsian games. 
A more significant worry is that Suitsian play is necessarily immature and unworthy 
of serious attention. Suitsian games always involve practical struggles. We become ab-
sorbed in the instrumental activity of overcoming obstacles and achieving seemingly ar-
bitrary goals. And it is precisely these aspects that can make game playing seem like a 
lesser activity. For example, media critic Andrew Darley condemns video games for of-
fering only “surface play” and “direct sensorial stimulation”. Says Darley: “Computer 
games are machine-like: they solicit intense concentration from the player who is caught 
up in their mechanisms … leaving little room for reflection other than an instrumental 
type of thinking that is more or less commensurate with their own workings” (Darley 
2000; Lopes 2010, 117). The same worry recurs in the new wave of games scholarship, 
even among some of games’ most ardent defenders. These scholars often argue for the 
worth of games by pointing out how games can offer us rich content, beyond mere in-
strumental challenges. Such arguments often proceed by highlighting games’ capacity to 
represent. For example, Ian Bogost argues for the value of games by showing that games 
can be a form of rhetoric, making arguments via their ability to simulate the world. Bogost 
points to games like The McDonald’s Game. In that game, you run the McDonald’s corpo-
ration. Your goal is to maximize profits while protecting the environment. But when you 
play the game, you quickly discover that you cannot actually pull off both of these goals. 
                                                             4	Some	readers	may	agree	with	me	that	Suitsian	games	are	only	one	type	of	game;	others	might	think	that	all	games	are	Suitsian	games.	My	argument	should	be	palatable	to	both.	Even	those	Wittgensteinians	who	maintain	that	the	term	‘game’	is	essentially	indefinable	should	be	able	to	find	my	analysis	somewhat	palata-ble,	by	treating	the	category	of	‘Suitsian	games’	as	an	artificial	stipulation.	I’m	not	particularly	interested	in	the	question	of	I	am	not	interested	in	debating	whether	or	not	the	category	of	Suitsian	games	does	or	does	not	match	up	with	some	bit	of	natural	language;	I	am	interested	in	the	fact	that	the	category	is	clearly	specified,	useful,	and	clearly	applies	to	some	of	our	activities.	
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The game argues, through its simulation, that the goals of capitalism and the goals of 
environmentalism are essentially at odds (Bogost 2010, 28-31). John Sharp reserves his 
highest praise for those games that move beyond the “hermetically sealed” experiences 
of merely solving the game, and instead represent and comment on the world. Sharp 
highlights games like Mary Flanagan’s game Career Moves. Career Moves resembles that 
old family game, The Game of Life, but forces the player to make stereotypically gendered 
career choices for their female character, in order to bring the player to reflect on gender 
biases in the workplace (Sharp 2015, 77-97). Flanagan herself praises Gonzolo Frasca’s 
game September 12th: A Toy World, a pointedly political game in which one plays the United 
States dropping bombs by drone on an unnamed Middle-Eastern locale, attempting to 
kill terrorists, only to find that all their efforts only destroy the innocent civilians and 
increase the number of terrorists (Flanagan 2013, 239-40).  
Notice that these sorts of accountings pick out a very particular type of game as gen-
uinely respectable. September 12th, Career Moves, and The McDonald’s Game may not present 
very interesting instrumental challenges, but that is unimportant by these lights. These 
games are good in virtue of what they represent. Underneath all these approaches seems 
to be the presumption that Suitsian play — the play of skills and clearly defined goals — 
cannot be valuable in any really deep or fulfilling way. These accounts seem motivated 
by the need to find some other footing from which to establish the value of games.  
But I think we ought not dismiss instrumental play so quickly. That dismissal arises, 
I think, from misunderstanding the richly varied motivational structures involved in 
game playing. Let’s return to the distinction between goals and purposes. The distinction 
helps us see that there are two very different modes of play. First, you might be playing 
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for the sake of winning. Either you want the win for its own sake or for the sake of some-
thing that follows from winning, like goods and money.5 Let’s call this achievement play. 
Professional poker players who play for money, Olympic athletes who play for honor, 
and people who simply play to win are all achievement players. In achievement play, 
goal and purpose are aligned. Alternately, you might be pursuing the win for the sake of 
the struggle. Let’s call that striving play. In striving play, goal and purpose are skew. An 
achievement player plays to win. A striving player acquires, temporarily, an interest in 
winning for the sake of the struggle. Thus, striving play involves a motivational inversion 
from ordinary life. In ordinary practical life, we pursue the means for the sake of the ends. 
But in striving play, we pursue the ends for the sake of the means. We take up a goal for 
the sake of the activity of struggling for it.  
This motivational inversion is, in my eyes, the most interesting possibility raised by 
the Suitsian analysis. I will largely focus my analysis on striving play, not because I think 
it is the superior form of play, but because I think it is the more convoluted, more fasci-
nating, and most frequently misunderstood form of play. Thinking about striving play 
will teach us something remarkable about ourselves, as rational agents that are capable 
of inducing such motivational inversions.  
                                                             5	It	should	be	noted	that	“winning”	here	is	slightly	imprecise.	There	are	many	other	sorts	of	states	we	can	pursue	in	games.	For	example,	one	might	have	lost	the	opportunity	to	actually	win	in	particular	chess	match,	but	one	can	still	play	on,	aiming	to	achieve	a	stalemate	rather	than	an	outright	loss.	For	another,	as	Suits	points	out,	many	games	don’t	have	victory	condition,	but	only	loss	conditions.	For	example:	a	ping	pong	vol-ley,	where	we	try	to	keep	the	ball	going	as	long	as	possible,	has	no	win	condition,	only	a	loss	condition,	and	the	goal	of	the	activity	is	to	stave	off	the	loss	for	as	long	as	possible.	Technically,	what	I	should	be	discussing	here	is	not	“winning”,	but	pursuit	of	the	lusory	goal,	in	the	its	various	shades	and	forms.	However,	I	will	use	the	term	“winning”	loosely,	from	here	on	out,	to	refer	to	the	larger	notion	of	the	pursuits	of	lusory	goals,	and	use	the	terms	“achieving	a	victory”	and	“winning	proper”	to	refer	to	the	narrower	notion.	I	do	not	use	the	term	“success”	because	I	think	its	natural	use	is	ambiguous	between	win-related	concepts,	and	our	larger	pur-poses	for	playing	a	game.	My	spouse	will	say	that	the	playing	of	a	party	game	was	“successful”	if	it	was	fun	for	all	involved,	regardless	of	whether	she	did	well	by	the	internal	standard	of	the	game.	
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But first, let’s take a step back. Does striving play really exist? I think it is quite com-
monplace, in fact. For example: my spouse and I once took up racquetball in order to keep 
fit in a moderately entertaining way. When we play racquetball, I try to win with all my 
might. And my trying to win — my actually caring about winning, during the course of 
the game — is quite useful.  Wanting to win helps my fitness by getting me to try harder 
during the game; it also helps the process be engaging and compelling. In order to obtain 
those benefits, I need to induce in myself an interest in winning. But that interest is only 
temporary and disconnected from my larger and more enduring ends.  
We can see how disconnected and short-term that interest is by looking at how I stra-
tegically manipulate my ability to win in the long-term. Suppose somebody offered me 
free racquetball lessons. These lessons would cause me to jump far ahead of my spouse 
in skill. If I was an achievement player, I should certainly take them. But, as a matter of 
fact, I wouldn’t actually take those lessons. If either my spouse or myself pulled substan-
tially ahead of the other in skill, the game would turn quite unpleasant for the both of us. 
Our matches would lose their interest and spark. We’d probably end up giving up rac-
quetball altogether. In other words: in my long-term life, I make strategic decisions that 
keep my skill in check and prevent me from winning too many games. I manipulate my 
capacity to win with an eye towards maintaining a desirable sort of struggle. But during 
the game itself, I play all-out to win. If my decision to forego those lessons is comprehen-
sible, then striving play is a real motivational possibility.   
Consider, also, what we might call “stupid games”. Stupid games have the following 
characteristics: first, they are only fun if you try to win; and second, the fun part is when 
you fail. There are a great many stupid games, including many drinking games and party 
games. Take a game like Twister, in which you try to keep in balance as long as you can, 
but the funniest part is when everybody collapses on top of each other. My own favorite 
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stupid game is Bag On Your Head, a ludicrous party game where everybody puts a brown 
paper grocery bag on their head. The goal of the game is to try to take the bags off of other 
people’s heads. When somebody takes the bag off your head, you’re out, and you have 
to go to the side of the room and leave play. The game, of course, involves lots of stum-
bling and tripping and flailing around by people with bags on their heads. And the best 
vantage point to watch all this for the losers, watching from the side. And, at some point, 
there will be only one person stumbling blindly around the room with a still bag on their 
head, fumbling around for the other non-existent opponents, while everybody else gets 
to watch, desperately trying not to laugh. That last person is the winner, and the very best 
part of the game is seeing how long it takes them to figure out that they have, in fact, 
won.  
The children’s game of Telephone is also a stupid game. You may remember the game 
from your childhood. To play, everybody sits in a circle. The starting player thinks of a 
message and then whispers it to the person next to them. The players pass the message 
on, each whispering to the next, until the message makes its way all around the circle. 
Then the players compare the original version with the circulated version. The circulated 
version is, inevitably, wildly distorted, much to everybody’s amusement. We play the 
game because it’s funny, and the funny part is failing, but it’s only funny if our attempts 
to communicate really were failures. And that failure is real only if the players really did 
earnestly try to communicate clearly. Imagine if we played Telephone, but we intention-
ally tried to distort the message. There would be no actual failure and thus no hilarity. In 
Twister and Telephone, to have the desired experience — a funny failure — the players 
must pursue success. But success isn’t the point. Stupid games cannot be properly played 
by achievement players, but only by striving players. Stupid games make sense only if 
striving play is possible.  
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And if striving play is possible, it must also be that we have a further capacity. We 
must be able to submerge ourselves in the temporary agency of the game. In order to en-
gage in striving play, I must be able to take on a disposable end. That is, I must be able to 
bring myself to temporarily care about an end, and for that end to appear to me as final. 
But I also must be able to dispose of that end afterwards. Why must submersion in a 
temporary agency be possible? Why must we be able to take on disposable ends?  
Imagine what it would be like if we could not submerge ourselves in this way. Imagine 
a striving player who could only pursue game ends in the normal, transparently instru-
mental fashion — who could not submerge themselves in an alternate agency. Their pur-
pose in play is having a struggle, and that purpose is perpetually before their minds and 
active in their reasoning. This striving player, then, couldn’t really pursue the game-end 
wholeheartedly. If we were always constantly aware of, and fully motivated by, our 
broader purpose in striving play, then our struggles to achieve victory would be curiously 
undercut. In any game without a time-limit, if victory were in our grasp, it would be 
entirely reasonable to delay the victory in order to have more of the activity of striving.6 
But this would be very odd behavior and would defeat much of the point of striving play.  
A friend of mine relates the following story: his ten-year old son was beating my friend 
badly at Monopoly. The son was very much enjoying the experience. My friend discovered 
that every time he was about to lose, his son would sneak him some extra cash just to 
keep the game going. The son just wanted to extend the experience, to keep on beating 
his father forever. The story is funny precisely because the son is missing something cru-
cial about how game playing works. In order to be absorbed in a game, we must behave 
as if winning were a final end. That end must phenomenally engulf us, if we are be 
                                                             6	This	excellent	point	was	originally	raised	to	me	by	Christopher	Yorke.	
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gripped by the game and if its thrills and threats are to have emotional punch for us. We 
must pursue the goals of the game wholeheartedly, putting our larger purpose out of 
mind. In other words, we must submerge ourselves in a temporary agency. 
 
 
Aesthetic experiences of one’s own activity 
Stupid games are not the point of our inquiry; they are merely a blunt example to 
show the possibility of striving play. I’m interested in showing that games can be an art 
form. So let’s start by thinking about how games can support aesthetic experiences. (I do 
not mean to imply that aim of art is exclusively to provide aesthetic experiences, but only 
that it is one of the characteristic functions of art to do so.) The recent discussion of game 
aesthetics has largely focused on thinking about games as a form of fiction (Tavinor 2017, 
2009; Robson and Meskin 2016). What we lack is an aesthetics of Suitsian play. 
So: consider the category of aesthetic striving play — that is, game play engaged in for 
the sake of the aesthetic quality of the struggle. Can striving really give rise to aesthetic 
qualities, and what would those be like? Let’s start with some paradigmatically aesthetic 
qualities: those of gracefulness and elegance. We obviously attribute such aesthetic qual-
ities to particular playings of games, especially from the spectator’s perspective. Sports 
spectatorship, for example, is full of talk of the beauty and elegance of athletic motion. 
But the spectator’s perspective is not the end of the story. There are distinctive aesthetic 
qualities available primarily to the causally active game player. These are aesthetic qual-
ities of acting, deciding, and solving. 
And those aesthetic qualities can arise, not just for our actions in isolation, but for our 
actions as practically functional. Some actions are beautiful because of what they get 
done. Consider the difference between two superficially similar activities: dancing freely 
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and rock climbing. Dancing freely — as I do by myself with my headphones on — can be 
an aesthetic experience. My own movements can feel to me expressive, dramatic, and, 
once in a rare while, even a bit graceful. I also rock climb, and rock climbing is full of 
aesthetic experiences. Climbers praise particular climbs for having interesting movement 
or beautiful flow. But, unlike many traditional forms of dance, climbing aims at overcom-
ing obstacles. The climbing experiences that linger most potently in my mind are experi-
ences of movement as the solution to a problem— of my deliberateness and gracefulness 
which got me through a delicate sequence of holds (Nguyen 2017a). Dancing may occa-
sionally be a game, but climbing is essentially a game. It is unnecessary obstacles, taken 
on for the activity of trying to overcome them.  
Take another paradigmatically aesthetic property: harmony. When a chess player dis-
covers a move that elegantly escapes a trap, the harmony of the move — the lovely fit 
between the challenge and the solution — is available both to themselves and to outsid-
ers. But something more is available especially to the player: a special experience of har-
mony between their abilities and the challenges of the world. When your abilities are 
pushed to their maximum, when your mind or body is just barely able to do what’s re-
quired, when your abilities are just barely enough to cope with the situation at hand — 
that is an experience of harmony available primarily to the players themselves. It is a 
harmony between self and challenge, between the practical self and the obstacles of its 
world. It is a harmony of practical fit between your whole self and the world. 
This, it seems to me, is a paradigmatic aesthetic experience of playing games. Once 
we’ve seen it, we can see that aesthetic experiences with this character exist outside of 
games. I value philosophy because I value truth, but I also savor the feel of that beautiful 
moment of epiphany, when I finally find that argument that I was groping for. Games can 
provide consciously sculpted versions of those everyday experiences. There is a natural 
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aesthetic pleasure to working through a difficult math proof; chess seems designed, at 
least in part, to concentrate and refine that pleasure for its own sake. In ordinary practical 
life, we catch momentary glimpses, when we are lucky, of harmony between our abilities 
and our tasks. But often, there is no such harmony. Our abilities fall far short of the tasks, 
or the tasks are horribly dull, but we must put nose to grindstone and grade these papers 
anyway.  
But we can design games for the sake of this harmony of practical fit. In our games, 
the obstacles are designed to be solved by the human mind and the human body— unlike, 
say, the tasks of curing cancer or grading. John Dewey suggested that many of the arts 
are crystallizations of ordinary human experience (Dewey 2005). Fiction is the crystalli-
zation of telling people about what happened, visual arts are the crystallization of looking 
around and seeing, music is the crystallization of listening. Games, I claim, are the crys-
tallization of practicality. Aesthetic experience of action are natural and occur outside of 
games all the time. Fixing a broken car engine, figuring out a math proof, managing a 
corporation, even getting into a bar fight — each can have its own particular interest and 
beauty. These include the satisfaction of finding the elegant solution to an administrative 
problem, of dodging perfectly around an unexpected obstacle. These experiences are 
wonderful — but in the wild, they are far too rare. Games can concentrate those experi-
ences. When we design games, we can sculpt the shape of the activity to make beautiful 
action more likely. And games can intensify and refine those aesthetic qualities, just as a 
painting can intensify and refine the aesthetic qualities we find in the natural sights and 
sounds of the world. 
 Aesthetic striving games, then, are games designed primarily for the purpose of provid-
ing aesthetic experiences of practicality to their players. Notice that the categories of aes-
thetic striving games and aesthetic striving players do not quite always align. A game 
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could have been originally designed to promote achievement, but certain players might 
take it up for aesthetic striving. An achievement player could take up an aesthetic striving 
game simply because they wanted to win, but be lead by the game’s design into having 
aesthetic experiences along the way. But, in most cases, aesthetic striving games seem 
made for aesthetic striving players.   
Let’s return to Sign. Sign is distinctive in several ways. In many other role-playing 
games, such as Fiasco, the relationship of player to character is theatrical. The player may 
choose to have their character act counterproductively — against that character’s goals 
— because it would be narratively meaningful. In such a game, I might act out how out 
my character, a sad-sack con man, unwisely confesses his crimes to a pretty stranger in a 
bar. It is an idiotic choice for my character and works against all his goals, but I made the 
choice because I thought it would make for a satisfying narrative arc. Sign, on the other 
hand, is a striving game. The player must take up the goal of communicating their inner 
truth, pursuing it wholeheartedly in order to have the desired experience. But the players 
themselves aren’t really interested in winning, in any enduring sense. Their larger pur-
pose is to experience the precise texture of struggling, flailing, and barely managing to 
communicate. But one will only be gripped by these experiences if one genuinely tries to 
win during the game.  
The fact that Sign is an aesthetic striving game is particularly clear to me now that I 
have added my own house rule. I have decreed that, at the end of the game, nobody will 
explain what their inner truth was, nor will they say what they thought anybody else’s 
truth was. Nobody ever gets to find out if, in fact, we have successfully communicated 
each other, even though we pursued that goal during the game. My players and I all agree 
that this house-rule improves the strange potency of the game, and that it is very much 
in the spirit of the thing. This house-rule would be absurd if we actually cared about 
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winning in any enduring way. But it is perfectly comprehensible if winning were only a 
temporarily adopted interest, taken up for the aesthetic qualities of the pursuit. 
 
 
The artistic medium of games 
So how do game designers fashion these aesthetically rich struggles? It will be useful 
here to think in terms of the artistic medium of games. Let’s follow Joseph Margolis’s sug-
gestion and distinguish between a physical medium and an artistic medium (Margolis 
1980, 42-1 via Davies 2003, 183). Or, as Dominic Lopes puts it, an artistic medium is not 
merely a certain set of material, but a set of “technical resources” (Lopes 2014, 133-9). For 
example, in paintings, the physical medium consists of pigments applied to a surface, 
while the artistic medium includes various techniques, including brushstrokes.  
So: is there some sort of artistic medium in common to all aesthetic striving games? 
What is the medium of games? First, the medium, whatever it is, must be quite abstract, 
if it is to cover the wide variety of Suitsian games — which include video games, board 
games, role playing games, card games, sports, and party games. The medium couldn’t 
be something like, say, software, interactive video, or boards and pieces.7 
First, it is tempting to say that medium of games is constraints and obstacles. Cer-
tainly, that’s part of the story, but it doesn’t capture the full richness of the game de-
signer’s efforts. That view might seem plausibly, if we focused narrowly on only physical 
games, like traditional sports. Traditional sports are played in the physical world with 
                                                             7	If	the	reader	has	a	particular	theory	of	medium	here	that	forbids	such	abstraction,	please	substitute	the	term	‘artistic	resource’,	as	borrowed	from	(Riggle	2010).	For	a	useful	discussion	of	how	abstract	a	medium	might	be,	see	Elisabeth	Schellekens’s	discussion	of	ideas	as	the	medium	of	conceptual	art	(Schellekens	2007).	
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our actual physical bodies. Thus, the rules of a sport usually start with our physical bod-
ies, with our full range of abilities, and then selectively restricts our use of those abilities. 
For example, we might disallow the use of hands in soccer, or the use of punching and 
kicking in basketball. But game designers actually create new sorts of actions and possi-
bilities all the time.8 This is clearest in video games such as Portal, where I am given a gun 
that can shoot the ends of a wormhole into the world to create passageways. But we need 
not focus solely on such radically new abilities. Most games create new actions. “Taking 
a piece” in chess and “a home run” in baseball are new actions that arise only within the 
context of a particular rule set. 
In that case, we might be tempted to say, instead, that the artistic medium of games is 
rules. And perhaps this is right, if we had a sufficiently loose notion of “rule”. But under 
most standard uses of the term, this proposal doesn’t work either. Say that you mean by 
“rule” an explicit, stated principle for action that was mentally upheld by the players. 
First, as many computer game scholars have pointed out, much of what computer game 
designers are doing is designing the virtual environment through software manipula-
tions. The software environment is not a set of rules consciously held by a player; it has 
some independent existence (Leino 2012). Of course, you might think that the software 
code itself was a set of rules, just rules that ran on a computer rather than on a human 
brain. But even so, there’s more to game design than rules. The case is clearest with phys-
ical games. Think, for example, about obstacle courses and artificial rock climbs. What 
fills out the experience is the physical details of the material object, and how that partic-
ular physicality interacts with the specified rules and the goals of the game. The physi-
cality of games extends even to video games. A rule might tell you to use a particular 
                                                             8	(Cardona-Rivera	and	Young	2013)	offers	a	useful	survey	of	work	on	game	affordances.	
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game console controller, but the physicality of the controller itself partially conditions the 
gaming experience.9 The video game PewPewPewPewPewPewPewPewPew illustrates this 
quite nicely. In the game, two people together control a single avatar, who has a jetpack 
and a ray gun. Both players have microphones. One player controls the jetpack by shout-
ing “SHHHH” into their microphone; the other player controls the gun by shouting 
“Pew! Pew! Pew!” into their microphone. Imagine the different texture of practical expe-
rience if that were played with buttons instead. And, even when played with micro-
phones, so much depends on the physical details — the sensitivity of the microphones, 
the acoustics of the room. These aren’t just rules — these are environmental features. 
What unites software environments and physical environments is their relationship to 
challenge. We might say, then, that part of the medium is the practical environment — the 
environment conceived of in its opposition to our goals and abilities.  
This points us towards the last key element of game design — the goal. Reiner Knizia, 
elder statesman of German board game design, has said that the central tool in his game 
design arsenal is the scoring system. The scoring system creates the motivation, says Kni-
zia (Chalkey 2008). The scoring system tells you whether you need to collaborate or com-
pete with the other players. And the scoring system helps create how that interactions 
goes. The goals, combined with the game’s mechanics, tells us whether we are to manip-
ulate our opponents or bargain with them, whether we are to cleverly profit off their ac-
tions or simply attack them. A game’s goals tell us what to care about during the game. 
When we play a game, we simply take on the goals it indicates, and acquire the motiva-
tions that the game wishes us to acquire. 
Think about a board game night between friends. We sit down to the game table and 
                                                             9	For	a	study	of	the	aesthetics	of	our	physical	interaction	with	video	game	controllers,	see	(Kirkpatrick	2011,	87-116).	
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pull out a new board game that has just arrived in the mail, taking off the shrink wrap. 
We pop out the cardboard tokens in a great heap on the table and begin to sort them into 
neat piles of green tokens, blue tokens, and gold tokens. We don’t know what these tokens 
are; the physical tokens themselves have no particular importance. If, for instance, my 
dog ate all the blue tokens, we could replace them with pennies and still be able to play 
the game. Now we open the rule-book, which tells us that the gold tokens are money, and 
are useful for buying various resources during the game but don’t count towards victory 
at the end. The winner will be the person who has collected the most green tokens. Notice 
that, before the game starts, we have no interest in collecting green tokens. But during the 
game, we acquire a hearty interest in the green tokens, to the point where an insufficiency 
of tokens may inspire armpit sweats, jitters, and a surge of adrenaline at the prospect of 
a last-ditch plan to get more. And once the game is finished, we lose our interest in the 
green tokens entirely, shove all of them into a messy pile and scoop them into a Ziplock.  
What the Suitsian analysis suggests is that games are structures of practical reason, 
practical action and practical possibility, conjoined with a particular world in which that 
practicality will operate. A game designer designates this as the goal of the game player, 
and those as the permitted abilities, and that as the landscape of obstacles. The designer 
creates, not only the world in which the player will act, but the skeleton of their practical 
agency within that world. The designer designates the player’s abilities and goals in the 
game. The designer’s control over the form of the player’s agency is part of how the game 
designer sculpts the game’s activity. Games can offer us more finely tuned practical har-
monies because the designers have control over both world and agent.  
We now have an answer to the question of artistic medium. The common artistic me-
dium of aesthetic striving games — the technical resources by which the game designer 
sculpts practical experience — are the goals, the rules, and the environment which these 
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various parts animate into a system of constraints. The game designer crafts for their 
players a very particular form of struggle, and does so by crafting both a temporary prac-
tical agency for us to inhabit and a practical environment for us to struggle against. In 
other words, the medium of the game designer is agency. If you want a slogan, try this 
one: games are the art of agency. 
Note that I haven’t offered anything like a definition of agency. This is intentional. I 
do not take there to be a settled account of agency in general, and that literature is cur-
rently undergoing a number of upheavals. Much of this change is due to challenges re-
garding the possible existence of group agents and collective agents, like companies and 
corporations, and other edge cases, including animal agency, robot agency, and the 
agency of algorithms (Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde 2009; List and Pettit 2011; Gilbert 
2013). When I speak of agency, I will generally be thinking in terms of a fairly traditional 
conception — where agency involves intentional action, or action for a reason. I am in no 
way presuming that this is a complete account of agency. I don’t think we need a full 
definition or metaphysical account of ‘paper’ to usefully say that origami uses the me-
dium of paper folding, and I don’t think we need to settle on a particular philosophical 
account of ‘agency’ to usefully say that games use the medium of agency. In fact, I think 
that investigating how games work in the medium of agency will actually teach us some-
thing about the nature of our agency. 
But this basic idea — that games work in the medium of agency — reveals something 
quite profound about the role games can play in human life, especially our social lives. 
Games turn out to be a way of writing down forms of agency, of inscribing them in an 
artifact. Games are among our techniques for inscribing and recording bits of human ex-
perience. We have developed methods for recording stories: novels, poetry, film, and 
other kinds of narrative. We have developed methods for capturing sights: drawing, 
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painting, photography and film. We have developed methods for capturing sounds: writ-
ten music, recording technologies, and wooden duck calls. We have even developed 
methods for capturing sequences of action to be performed — cookbook directions, dance 
choreography, and stage directions. Games are a method for capturing forms of agency. 
And these techniques and technologies enable all sorts of interactions and modifications. 
Once we can write something down, that enables us to more easily study and refine it. 
And this suggests another possibility: that games can be a way that we collaborate in 
the project of developing our agency and autonomy. If games can record and transmit 
forms of agency, then I can learn new modes of agency from a game. And you may write 
down a useful form of agency and pass it to me, through a game. This may, in the abstract, 
seem slightly insane. But I think it is, in fact, quite plausible, especially when we think of 
what we actually learn from games. I am not alone in thinking that I acquired a certain 
focused, logical, and tactical mindset from chess. Rock climbing taught me to focus pre-
cisely on my balance and precisions of motion. Tetris gave me the mental state required 
to pack my trunk optimally for a trip. My suggestion here is more than that familiar old 
saw, that games teach us skills and develop our abilities. My claim is that games can teach 
us the agential mindsets behind those skills — the pairings of a particular kind of interest, 
with a focus on a particular set of abilities. And the practice of striving play itself teaches 
us how to be flexible with our agency — how to pick up and set aside interests for a 
moment. That flexibility is of great use outside of game. We use our agential flexibility 
when we switch between our various roles, such as parent, professional, and friend, and 
adopt the different frames of mind that go with such roles. 
As it turns out, the development of our agency and autonomy is not a solitary project. 
As with many of our other aspects — our scientific understanding, our logical capacities, 
our morality — we can help each other in the project of personal self-development, and 
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we often do so, not just in person, but through artifactual vessels. And games are an arti-
factual vessel with which we can communicate modes of agency. The games that we have 
made constitute a library of agency, in which we have recorded a vast variety of different 
forms of agencies, and which we can use to explore different ways of being an agent. And 
it is our capacity to submerge ourselves in alternate agencies that makes it possible for us 
to use this library.  
 
 
Games and artificiality 
But games also offer one more promise. They can function as a refuge from the inhos-
pitality of ordinary life. In practical life, the world is mostly fixed and our values rela-
tively inflexible. Most of us cannot help but desire company, food, success. The recalci-
trant world and our inflexible values generate certain obstacles. These are not the obsta-
cles we wanted to struggle against, but they are the ones we must overcome, in order to 
get what we want. So we must try to sculpt ourselves and our abilities to fit the needs of 
the world. The world tells us we must eat, so we must find a job and pretend to ourselves 
that we enjoy it. The world tells us that we must find romantic partners, so we learn to be 
witty, or at least to make to make a decent online dating profile. The world tells us that, 
if we wish to be professional philosophers, we must grade an endless sea of student pa-
pers, no matter how mind-numbing we find the task. So we put nose to grindstone and 
force our way through. 
In games, on the other hand, we sculpt for ourselves exactly the kind of practical ac-
tivity which we wish to engage in. We pick the goals, ability, and a world. In games, our 
abilities can precisely suit the challenges we are presented with. In Super Mario Brothers, 
we are given the ability to run and jump, and a world full of chasms to jump over and 
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monsters to jump upon. What’s more, our jumping abilities and speed in Super Mario 
Brothers are just barely enough to cope with the chasms and monsters we face. The chess 
knight’s strange leaping movement is just what we need to break through our opponent’s 
defenses. In games, we are given not only the right kind of abilities, but just barely enough 
of them — which creates drama and interest. And not only do the abilities fit, but their 
exercise is often pleasurable and interesting and exciting, at least when we’ve found the 
right game for our tastes. 
How unlike our own dreary world this is! Our abilities sometimes fit our goals in the 
world, but so often they do not. We want to invent a cure for cancer, but lack the capacities 
to do it. We wish to help these students learn to write better, but the process is boring and 
mind-numbing and provokes occasional thoughts of suicide — or at least throwing it all 
in and becoming a lawyer instead. We do not fit this world comfortably. The obstacles in 
our path are often intractable, exhausting, or miserable. Games can be an existential balm 
for our practical unease with the world. In games, the problems can be right-sized for our 
capacities, our in-game selves can be right-sized for the problems, and the arrangement 
of self and world can make solving the problems pleasurable, satisfying, interesting, and 
beautiful. 
Even with our opponents, there is a harmony. In a good game, our opponent’s at-
tempts to harm us may, in the right circumstances, actually be channeled so as to create 
experiences we value. In ordinary life, social attacks and financial attacks are usually 
painful and unpleasant. They are to be survived and gotten over, but rarely can they be 
enjoyed. But games are often designed such that your attacks on me are channeled into 
interesting obstacles for me to overcome. Even our motivations can be curiously harmo-
nized, even if we are at each other’s throats. Outside of games, much of the pain and 
difficulty of social life with others arises from the dizzying plurality of values. Each of us 
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cares about different things; trying to mesh the plurality of disparate values into livable 
communities is incredibly difficult.  
In games, values are usually singular and shared. In games, each person is a simplified 
agent. And in most cases, competing agents are pursuing the same goal. When we are 
playing tennis, I do not have to cope with subtle differences between your and my view 
of the good. You and I are after exactly the same thing: points and victory. It is not that 
we are cooperating, exactly — but we are motivationally coherent to one another. In some 
sense, the motivational world described by traditional economics — one in which identi-
cally motivated rational actors compete with one another — is false of the actual world, 
but true of game worlds. When games work, they can sometimes present us with the 
world as we wish it would have been. The worlds of games are harmonious and interest-
ing worlds, where even our worst impulses are transformed into the pleasure of others. 
In ordinary life, we must build practical activities and relationships from gears that were 
never made to fit. But in games, we can machine all the gears to fit from the start.  
And this, I suspect, is both the great promise and the great threat of games. Games 
can offer us a clarifying balm against the vast, complicated, ever-shifting social world of 
pluralistic values; and an existential balm against our internal sense that our values are 
slippery and unclear. In games, values are clear, well-delineated, and typically uniform 
between all agents. But this also creates a significant moral danger from games — not just 
from graphically violent games, but from all games. This is the danger of exporting to 
back to the world a false expectation: that values are should be clear, well-delineated, and 
uniform in all circumstances. Games threaten us with a fantasy of moral clarity.  
The positive part of my view might seem rather familiar. Jane McGonigal makes a 
similar point in her argument for making our lives more game-like. The world wasn’t 
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made to fit us, she says, but games can be made to fit. Playing games is far more pleasur-
able; our motivations in games are more potent. Thus, concludes, McGonigal we should 
try to make life more like a game, by gamifying our work, our chores, and our education. 
We should fill our life with leaderboards, rankings, and badges, and fill our work with 
carefully engineered gamified systems, in order to make our work and educational lives 
more pleasant (McGonigal 2011).  
But this mistakes how peculiar game values are. We can tailor our struggles in games 
precisely because our game ends are disposable. But when we try to make the rest of life 
like a game, we will need to adapt our enduring ends to make the struggle more pleasur-
able and satisfying. But when we do that — when we instrumentalize our enduring ends 
as if our life were a game — we court disaster. When we gamify our ordinary life, we will 
be tempted to shift and simplify our ends for the sake of the struggle — but then we will 
no longer aiming at the same target. Games can be safely tailored precisely because they 
are games. 
Games involve taking on temporary ends and submerging ourselves in alternate 
agencies. And, like any other form of art, exactly the features that make games potentially 
valuable, also make them potentially dangerous. Games are the art form of agency, and 
it is in their use of agency where we will find both a great promise and a significant threat. 
 
 
I have sketched in this chapter the broad strokes of my view. The rest of the book will 
explore, in greater detail, many of these arguments and possibilities.  
In Part I, I’ll focus on the motivational structure of game-play. First, in Chapter 2, I’ll 
defend the possibility of striving play against skeptics. In Chapter 3, I’ll explore our ca-
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pacity for submerging ourselves in alternate agencies, and our ability to forget our en-
during ends for the span of the game. And I draw lessons for philosophical agency and 
practical reasoning from the fact that we can play games. Together, these two chapters are 
the heart of my theoretical account of the motivational structure of game play. They are 
the core of my philosophical account of the distinctiveness of game play. They are the 
philosophically densest chapters, but also the heart of the story. 
In Chapter 4, I’ll argue that games can play a special role in our development of our 
own agency and autonomy. Games can communicate modes of agency. And, when we 
play games, we can learn new modes of agency. Games can constitute a library of agencies, 
and we can use that library to grow. 
In Part II, I’ll focus on games as an art form. First, in Chapter 5, I’ll explore the aes-
thetics of agency. Beauty is not just confined to sunsets and symphonies; our own actions, 
choices, and decisions can also have their own kind of beauty. I’ll also defend the aesthet-
ics of agency against the worries that aesthetic experience is essentially incompatible with 
practical and instrumental states of mind. 
In Chapter 6, I’ll argue that games are significantly like traditional art works in some 
very important ways. Most importantly, games involve socially-maintained prescriptions 
for attention — they are a way of framing certain parts of the world for our appreciation. 
Games are a way of aesthetically framing our own practical activity.  
In Chapter 7, I’ll look at how games are distinctive as an art form. Unlike most tradi-
tional arts, the aesthetic qualities of a game arise, not in the artifact itself, but in the activ-
ity of the player. Thus, the aesthetic qualities of games are significantly distanced from 
the designer and the game itself. Thus, the game designer must cope with a distinctive 
artistic difficulty: they must achieve their aesthetic effects through the agency of the 
player. 
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In Part III, I’ll focus the social and moral consequences of the agential manipulations 
of games. First, in Chapter 8, I’ll argue that games not only work in the medium of agency, 
but also in the medium of sociality. Games arrange social relationships and create social 
patterns through their use of the agential medium. And in doing so, they can achieve 
some very remarkable effects, like transforming competition into cooperation.  
In Chapter 9, I’ll worry about a distinctive danger of the agential medium. Games 
might threaten our autonomy if we do not properly manage the transition back to non-
game life. Games may foster the expectation that values be clear, simple, and easily stated 
— that our goals be obvious and measurable. Games may present a fantasy of moral clar-
ity. And in Chapter 10, I’ll argue that aesthetic striving play might offer us some protec-
tion against the fantasy of moral clarity.  
One last word of warning: my discussion will involve a fairly large number of in-
depth case studies of particular games — far more than one might usually find in a work 
of academic philosophy, even one in aesthetics. This is due, in part, to the relative novelty 
of trying to present a unified account of the art form across a broad variety of games. My 
account will include computer games, team sports, solo sports, board games, card games, 
party games, tabletop role playing games, and live action role-playing games. Much of 
the recent discussion of games as an art form has focused fairly narrowly on a very small 
set of games: computer games, and mostly single-player computer games, often with a 
strong narrative component. I wish to broaden the focus. Unfortunately, there is no estab-
lished canon of games that I can depend on the reader to be familiar with. My case for 
depends on the reader’s seeing the extraordinary variety of ways that games make use of 
the medium of agency. So, if you’ll bear with me, I think it very important to describe, in 
loving detail, a fair number of games. And I hope that the reader, if sufficiently interested, 
will also seek out and play some of these games. I have played all of the games I mention 
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and have chosen to discuss what I think are exemplars of game design, with a few excep-
tions as noted. My hope is to develop, through both argument and examples, a compel-
ling picture of games as a very special type of human artifact and as a unique art form. 
 
 
